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Comment
United States v. Muschik: An Administrative
Law Critique of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines' Ability to Override Judicial
Statutory Interpretations
John P. Jurden
Richard Lee Muschik pleaded guilty to conspiracy1 to dis-
tribute lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD)2 in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)3 and 846.4 Muschik conspired to distribute
the LSD on blotter paper, known as a carrier medium. 5 The
1. United States v. Muschik, 49 F.3d 512, 513 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 25, 1995) (No. 95-156). On October 23,
1991, Muschik escaped from custody while awaiting trial on the drug charges.
Id. Federal authorities apprehended him on November 28, 1991, and on Janu-
ary 28, 1992, the district court convicted him of escape from federal custody in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751. Id. On March 12, Muschik pleaded guilty to the
conspiracy charge and on May 26, the district court combined his escape and
drug charges for sentencing purposes. Id.
2. LSD is a "crystalline compound that causes psychotic symptoms simi-
lar to those of schizophrenia." WEBSTER'S THmn NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
AnY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1351 (1986). LSD is categorized as a
hallucinogenic drug that is taken orally. AMRICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORERSs, § 304.50 (3d ed.
rev. 1987). Hallucinogen use produces, inter alia, anxdety, depression, illusions,
and tremors. Id. § 305.30.
3. In relevant part, § 841(a) provides that "telxcept as authorized by this
subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally... to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance...." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994).
4. Section 846 states that "[alny person who attempts or conspires to com-
mit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties
as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of
the attempt or conspiracy." Id. § 846. Although Muschik actually pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to distribute LSD in violation of § 846, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)
also governed his actions.
5. LSD dealers normally sell the drug in such small doses that they com-
monly create a "carrier" by dissolving the pure drug and spraying the solution
on paper or gelatin. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 457 (1991).
The solvent then evaporates, leaving small amounts of the drug trapped on the
carrier. Id.
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United States District Court for the District of Montana deter-
mined that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (the "sentencing statute")
imposed on Muschik a mandatory minimum sentence6 for dis-
tributing more than ten grams of a "mixture or substance con-
taining a detectable amount of [LSD]." 7 The district court
accordingly sentenced Muschik to a twenty-year prison term.8
Muschik appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction, but vacated the dis-
trict court's sentence and remanded for resentencing.9
On November 1, 1993, before Muschik's resentencing, the
United States Sentencing Commission amended the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, 10 thereby changing the manner of
calculating the weight of LSD for sentencing purposes. Amend-
ment 488 to the Guidelines provides, in certain situations, a
standard dosage weight for LSD' and removes the drug's car-
6. On May 26, 1992, the district court combined Muschik's escape and
drug charges for sentencing and determined that the amount of LSD involved
warranted application of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)'s mandatory minimum sen-
tence provisions. United States v. Muschik, 49 F.3d 512, 513 (9th Cir. 1995),
petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 25, 1995) (No. 95-156).
7. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v). Section 841(b)(1)(A) imposes, inter alia, a
mandatory sentence of not less than 10 years or more than life for distributing
certain controlled substances, including LSD, in certain amounts. Id.
8. The district court sentenced Muschik to a 20-year-term pursuant to the
mandatory minimum provision in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) and based on Mus-
chik's prior state felony drug conviction. Muschik, 49 F.3d at 513. The term of
a mandatory minimum sentence doubles where the defendant has one or more
prior felony drug convictions. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
9. Muschik, 49 F.3d at 513.
10. Congress provided authority for the Commission to amend the
Guidelines.
The Commission, at or after the beginning of a regular session of Con-
gress, but not later than the first day of May, may promulgate under
subsection (a) of this section and submit to Congress amendments to
the guidelines and modifications to previously submitted amendments
.... Such an amendment... shall take effect on a date specified by the
Commission... except to the extent that the effective date is revised or
the amendment is otherwise modified or disapproved by Act of
Congress.
28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1994).
11. The Background Commentary to § 2D1 of the Sentencing Guidelines
refers to Amendment 488 and provides that:
in cases involving LSD contained in a carrier medium, the Commission
has established a weight per dose of 0.4 milligrams for purposes of de-
termining the base offense level.... Because LSD typically is mar-
keted and consumed orally on a carrier medium, the inclusion of some
weight attributable to the carrier medium recognizes (A) that offense
levels for most other controlled substances are based upon the weight
of the mixture containing the controlled substance without regard to
purity, and (B) the decision in Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct.
1919 (1991) (holding that the term "mixture or substance" in 21 U.S.C.
470 [Vol. 80:469
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rier medium from the calculation of the total drug weight.12 The
United States Probation Office determined that, under the new
calculation method, the weight of the LSD sold by Muschik' 3
was 5.68 grams rather than the 101 grams calculated under the
prior method.' 4 Nevertheless, on December 6, 1993, the district
court resentenced Muschik to the same twenty-year term as im-
posed originally.' 5 The district court again included the weight
of the carrier medium that Muschik used when he sold the
drug.16 Muschik appealed the district court's decision and on
February 28, 1995, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
Muschik's sentence a second time,17 stating that Amendment
488 standardizes the weight of the LSD's carrier medium that
can be included in the total weight calculation for mandatory
minimum sentencing purposes.18 The court of appeals re-
manded Muschik's case for resentencing in accordance with its
decision. 19
§ 841(b)(1) includes the carrier medium in which LSD is absorbed)....
Thus, the approach decided upon by the Commission will harmonize
offense levels for LSD offenses with those for other controlled sub-
stances and avoid an undue influence of varied carrier weight on the
applicable offense level. Nonetheless, this approach does not override
the applicability of "mixture or substance" for the purposes of applying
any mandatory minimum sentence (see Chapman; § 5Gl.l(b)).
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2D1.1 (1994)
(emphasis added).
12. Prior to Amendment 488's enactment, weight calculation of LSD for
sentencing purposes under both the sentencing statute and the Guidelines fol-
lowed a literal "mixture or substance" interpretation that included the weight of
any carrier medium upon which dealers affixed LSD. See infra notes 85-92 and
accompanying text (discussing the holding and reasoning of Chapman v. United
States with respect to the pre-amendment calculation method).
Amendment 488 alters the LSD calculation method by prescribing a some-
what less stringent, but now uniform, 0.4 milligram per-dose formula. U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1.
13. The Sentencing Commission indicated that courts may apply Amend-
ment 488's new weight calculation formula retroactively in appropriate circum-
stances. U.S.S.G. § IB1.10(a) (noting that "[w]here a defendant is serving a
term of imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable to that defendant has
subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines... a
reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment is authorized under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)"); United States v. Holmes, 13 F.3d 1217, 1222 (8th Cir.
1994) (courts have discretion to apply Amendment 488 retroactively).
14. United States v. Muschik, 49 F.3d 512, 514 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 25, 1995) (No. 95-156).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 513.
17. Id. at 518.
18. United States v. Muschik, 49 F.3d 512,518 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 25, 1995) (No. 95-156).
19. Id. at 518.
1995]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
United States v. Muschik raises two important issues:
whether a Federal Sentencing Guideline amendment can dis-
place a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision, and the
extent to which courts should defer to the Federal Sentencing
Commission in its role as an independent agency within the ju-
dicial branch.20 Further, the Muschik court's reasoning illumi-
nates the problems resulting from Congress's placement of the
Federal Sentencing Commission within the judicial branch.
This placement has created confusion in the federal courts over
the extent of the Commission's authority. Accordingly, the re-
sult in Muschik is hardly surprising, but nevertheless incorrect.
This Comment examines the Muschik court's failure to com-
ply with principles of statutory interpretation and administra-
tive law. Part I discusses the United States Sentencing
Commission's role as an independent agency within the judicial
branch and reviews traditional rules of statutory interpretation.
Part I also surveys the existing circuit split resulting from at-
tempts to conform the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with Con-
gress's mandatory minimum drug sentence statutes. Part H
discusses the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning in Mus-
chik. Finally, Part I argues that the Muschik court deviated
from administrative law and statutory interpretation principles.
In particular, Part III asserts the Muschik court attributed ex-
cessive authority to Amendment 488 and improperly displaced
the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 841 in Chapman v.
United States.21 This Comment argues that Amendment 488
serves a legitimate purpose other than displacing the meaning
of § 841 and that Congress must clarify the meaning of § 841
before courts diverge from the existing statutory interpretation.
I. RECONCILING AGENCIES' ROLES WITH TBE
PURPOSES OF DRUG SENTENCING AND POST-
CHAPMAN V. UNITED STATES
FALLOUT
Traditional administrative bodies enjoy wide discretion in
formulating policies through their rulemaking ability. This dis-
cretion often includes the authority to interpret statutes promul-
gated by Congress. The United States Sentencing Commission,
20. For a thorough analysis of the role of the Federal Sentencing Conmis-
sion as viewed from an administrative law vantage point see Ronald F. Wright,
Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Perspective on the Federal
Sentencing Commission, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 3 (1991).
21. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
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although an independent agency, differs somewhat from a tradi-
tional agency. Congress has placed institutional checks on the
Commission's rulemaking, and the federal judiciary has ap-
peared reluctant to accept the Commission's authority. In par-
ticular, Congress's promulgation of mandatory minimum drug
sentence statutes has called into question the extent of the Com-
mission's authority over federal sentencing.
A. ADMINIsTRATrIVE LAw THEoRiEs AND ThE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING CoMMIssIoN: A RECIPE FOR CONFUCT
1. The Role of Traditional Agencies in Promulgating Rules
and Clarifying Laws
In their role as administrators of congressionally-created
programs, traditional agencies 22 routinely formulate policy
through rulemaking.23 When confronted with new develop-
ments in their area of expertise, agencies have wide authority to
adopt new policies, or even to change laws. 24 An agency's inter-
pretation of its own regulations normally controls unless it vio-
lates a federal statute or the Constitution.25
22. "Traditional" agencies trace their roots back to the New Deal era, when
Congress created a "massive administrative apparatus" to carry out the New
Deal agenda. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2079 (1990). Traditional agencies are generally associ-
ated with the executive branch, although some "independent" agencies enjoy a
degree of political insulation from the executive branch. See Wright, supra note
20, at 13-14. This Comment differentiates such "traditional" agencies from the
Federal Sentencing Commission in the same way that the Supreme Court dif-
ferentiated the Commission in Mistretta v. United States. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
The Mistretta Court characterized the Commission as an independent agency
located within the judicial branch of the federal government. Id. at 393-94.
23. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
24. See American Trucking Assn's., Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967) (upholding as essential, the agency's adaptation of
its rules and practices to the changing needs and patterns of transportation);
American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90, 105
(1946) (upholding a delegation of authority to the Securities and Exchange
Commission to prevent unfair distribution of voting power among securities
voters); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1943) (upholding a congres-
sional delegation of authority to the Price Administrator to fix fair commodity
prices that would effectuate the purposes of the Emergency Price Control Act).
See also Sunstein, supra note 22, at 2088 (arguing that "administrators are in a
far better position than courts to interpret ambiguous statutes in a way that
takes account of new conditions"). But see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (noting that the judiciary's role is to "say what the law
is").
25. Stinson v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1919 (1993) (citing Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
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The judiciary is the final arbiter on statutory construction
issues, however, and it will reject agency interpretations that
contradict clear congressional intent.26 Moreover, once a court
determines the meaning of a statute, it adheres to that interpre-
tation under the doctrine of stare decisis.27 Unfortunately, Con-
gress often words statutes ambiguously and declines to identify
whether courts or agencies should resolve the ambiguity.28 The
Chevron doctrine addresses this problem.29
Under the Chevron doctrine, courts normally defer to an ad-
ministrative agency's interpretation of a statutory provision the
agency administers. 30 Judicial deference is warranted by agen-
cies' policy-making and fact-finding competence, combined with
their electoral accountability. 31 An agency may clarify ambigu-
26. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837, 843 n.9 (1984) (citing Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981); Securities Exch. Comm'n v. Sloan,
436 U.S. 103, 117-18 (1978); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,
411 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1973)); Cf. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348-
49 (1991) (implicitly indicating that in the Federal Sentencing Guideline con-
text the Court will look first to the Federal Sentencing Commission and its
amendment authority to address intercircuit interpretive conflicts over the
Guidelines).
27. Maislin Indus. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990).
28. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101
HARv. L. REv. 421, 467 (1987) (arguing that ambiguity alone does not signal a
congressional delegation of interpretive authority to an agency); cf. Sunstein,
supra note 22, at 2090 (noting that "Congress has rendered no general decision
about which institution should interpret the statutes it enacts").
29. The Chevron doctrine derives from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See generally Thomas W. Merrill,
Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 351, 352-
53 (1994) (outlining the Chevron doctrine's basic two-step inquiry that courts
undertake when deciding whether to defer to an agency interpretation).
30. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536 (1992); NLRB v. Food &
Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987). See also Merrill, supra note 29,
at 358 (noting that "[slome lower courts ... had treated [the Chevron doctrine]
like the magna carta of deference"); cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Pluralism, the Pris-
oner's Dilemma, and the Behavior of the Independent Judiciary, 88 Nw. U. L.
REv. 396, 399 (1993) (noting that courts first look to legislative intent and then
defer to agency interpretations when interpreting statutes). But cf RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMInSTRATrVE LAw AND PROCESS 350-54 (1985) (arguing
that review of administrative provisions is both a legitimate and necessary judi-
cial function).
31. Statutory authority permits the President to name executive non-in-
dependent agency leaders and to revoke their status at any time. 3 U.S.C.
§ 301 (1994). The Executive Department may exert some degree of control over
even "independent" agencies by controlling their resources and influencing per-
sonnel decisions. See Wright, supra note 20, at 14 n.51. See also Sunstein,
supra note 22, at 2084 (noting that, in Chevron, the Environmental Protection
Agency's competence and electoral accountability heavily influenced the inter-
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ous statutory provisions unless its interpretation is arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to a statute. 32 As a rule, courts reviewing
an agency's interpretation require merely that the agency base
its interpretation on a "permissible construction of the stat-
ute."3 3 The Supreme Court, however, has placed two significant
checks on an agency's power to interpret ambiguous statutory
provisions. Courts reject an agency's statutory interpretation
that contradicts prior judicial interpretations 34 or that directly
conflicts with a governing statute. 35 Courts also limit the scope
of an agency's interpretive power to those statutes within the
agency's domain.3 6
Judicial authority to review agency actions and interpreta-
tions derives from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of
1946.37 The APA, however, speaks only of the judicial review of
pretation of the statutory term at issue). Cf. Maislin Indus., 497 U.S. at 134
(noting that the Interstate Commerce Commission has the expertise to adopt
new policies when faced with new industrial developments).
32. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see also Maislin Indus., 497 U.S. at 119 (not-
ing that the Interstate Commerce Commission has primary responsibility for
determining whether motor common carrier rates are reasonable); Motor Vehi-
cle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983) (finding
that an administrative decision that "failed to consider an important aspect" of
an issue is arbitrary or capricious); Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473, 480 (1956)
(deferring to the Secretary of Labor's definition of "area of production" in the
Fair Labor Standards Act because the Secretary "fulfills his role when he
makes a reasoned definition"); RCA v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 420 (1951)
(noting that courts must not overrule decisions, given agencies' expertise in an
area, merely because courts disagree with the wisdom of the policy); Federal
Sec. Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1943) (deferring to the
Food and Drug Administrations rulemaking because of traditional deference to
expert administrative bodies' informed judgment); cf Wright, supra note 20, at
47 (arguing that, in the federal sentencing context, courts "cannot blindly apply
a guideline that is based on a misinterpretation of the underlying statute").
33. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. But cf. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,
488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (noting that an agency's position during litigation does
not trigger deference under the Chevron doctrine).
34. Maislin Indus., 497 U.S. at 131.
35. Id. at 134-35; cf. Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993)
(holding that, in the federal sentencing context, the Sentencing Commission's
Guidelines interpretation is binding unless it violates the Constitution or a fed-
eral statute).
36. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 2093 (noting that "the principle of def-
erence does not extend to interpretations by agencies that have not been
granted the authority to interpret the law"); cf. Federal Maritime Comm'n v.
Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973) (noting that an agency "may not
bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction").
37. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994). Sections 701-706 of Title 5 gov-
ern, inter alia, the right to seek judicial review of agency action, the types of
action that courts may review, and the scope of judicial review. Section 706
provides in relevant part that "the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
1995] 475
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"agencies," and not of bodies within the judiciary38 -such as the
United States Sentencing Commission.
2. The Role of the United States Sentencing Commission
The United States Sentencing Commission is a perma-
nent3 9 rulemaking administrative body.40 Congress established
the Commission in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).41
Congress granted the Commission the authority to provide sen-
tencing guidance for the federal courts through the promulga-
tion of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 42 Thus, the
Commission is related by statute to the judicial, rather than the
executive, branch of the federal government.43
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and deter-
mine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action."
38. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B) defines an agency as "not includ[ing] ... the courts
of the United States."
39. William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guide-
line Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 63, 65 (1993). The Commission includes seven voting members
whom the President appoints "by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate." 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). At least three of these seven members are federal
judges subject to removal by the President for neglect of duty, malfeasance in
office, or for other good cause. Id.
40. Section 991(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code authorizes the
Commission to develop "sentencing policies and practices for the Federal crimi-
nal justice system." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b). Congress granted the Commission tem-
porary Guidelines amendment authority to counteract courts' potential
invalidation of the Guidelines. Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182,
§ 21, 101 Stat. 1266, 1271 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994 nt. (1988)).
41. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3661-3672 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998).
42. The SRA provides direction to the Sentencing Commission.
(a) The Commission... shall promulgate and distribute to all courts of
the United States and to the United States Probation System -
(1) guidelines, as described in this section, for use of a sentencing
court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case,
including -
(A) a determination whether to impose a sentence to proba-
tion, a fine, or a term of imprisonment;
(B) a determination as to the appropriate amount of a fine or
the appropriate length of a term of probation or a term of
imprisonment.
28 U.S.C. § 994(a).
The Commission has discretionary authority to determine the severity of
sentencing for federal crimes and to assess the weight of offender characteris-
tics that Congress provided for the Commission's consideration. Id. § 994(c)-(d).
The Commission also has discretion when deciding which crimes courts tradi-
tionally have punished either too severely or too leniently. Id. § 994(m).
43. Congress associated the Sentencing Commission with the federal judi-
ciary by denoting it as an independent commission within the judicial branch
and by including federal judges in the Commission. Id. § 991(a). In passing the
476 [Vol. 80:469
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In addition to sharing a degree of its policy-making function
with the federal judiciary,44 there are other attributes that dis-
tinguish the Commission from a traditional agency. Although
the Commission's Guidelines are subject to congressional
amendment or revocation within the 180-day note and comment
period required under usual agency rulemaking,45 the Commis-
sion does not necessarily receive the usual judicial deference ac-
corded to traditional agencies. This complicates the
Commission's mission.46 The SRA's legislative history, for in-
stance, suggests Congress's intent that courts consider the fair-
ness and appropriateness of sentences mandated by the
Guidelines, and that they impose individualized sentences in ap-
propriate circumstances.4 7 The Commission thus occupies an
uncertain position as both a guide to the judiciary and its un-
easy partner in the sentencing process. 48
SRA, Congress envisioned substantial interaction between the Sentencing
Commission and the Federal Prisons Bureau. Id. § 994(o).
For a view of the Commission as a non-judicial branch agency, see Mis-
tretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (noting that the Commission
"is an independent agency in every relevant sense").
44. See Wright, supra note 20, at 17-19 (discussing the federal judiciary's
sharing of policymaking duties with the Commission); Donald P. Lay, Rethink-
ing the Guidelines:A Call for Cooperation, 101 YALE L.J. 1755, 1762 (1992) (not-
ing that federal courts of appeal have restricted the authority of judges to
depart from the Guidelines); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 374 (1991) (noting
that the Supreme Court itself implements interpretive canons that reflect tradi-
tional policy preferences).
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 99 4(p).
46. For instance, courts must determine whether the Commission ade-
quately considered aggravating or mitigating circumstances when it formulated
the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). But see Daniel J. Freed, Federal
Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1699-1700 (1992) (noting that district judges
rarely respond to Congress's invitation to review the Guidelines).
47. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 52 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235.
48. See Wright, supra note 20, at 22 (noting that federal judges are simul-
taneously policymakers and parties regulated by the Commission in the federal
sentencing process).
Judge Donald P. Lay of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted the ten-
sion inherent in the Commission-judiciary relationship in an open letter that he
wrote to the Commission. He described the dynamics of this relationship at a
1992 meeting of the Sentencing Institute for the Second and Eighth Circuits:
As the meeting progressed, many of the Commissioners expressed
their disdain for the views of certain members of the federal judiciary.
One Commissioner openly accused the judiciary of being arrogant. He
claimed that Congress took away the sentencing discretion of federal
judges because they could not be trusted in the sentencing process. At
the same time, however, many judges challenged the Commissioners'
19951
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B. TiiE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND THE
ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986
1. The United States Sentencing Guidelines
The United States Sentencing Guidelines are limited rules
that remain subordinate to any overriding statutes.49 The ulti-
mate objective of the Guidelines is to provide proportionality
and uniformity in federal sentencing.50 In accordance with the
SRA,51 the Guidelines seek to limit judicial sentencing discre-
tion in furtherance of these concerns. 5 2 While congressional in-
terference with the Federal Sentencing Commission's drafing
discretion has been significant, 53 the Commission retains signifi-
cant authority to promulgate the Guidelines.54
attitudes and criticisms of the federal judiciary. It appears to many of
us that the Commission is not interested in receiving input from the
federal bench. Similarly, many judges seem to have stopped listening
to the Commission.
Lay, supra note 44, at 1768.
49. Freed, supra note 46, at 1695, 1730.
50. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. (n.3) (Nov. 1992); cf 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b)(1)(B) (stating that the goal of the Guidelines is to reduce "unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar criminal conduct").
51. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing the Sentencing
Reform Act).
52. The Sentencing Reform Act makes the Sentencing Commission's
Guidelines binding on the courts, but allows a judge to depart from the Guide-
lines if the judge finds an aggravating or mitigating factor that the Commission
failed to consider adequately when it formulated the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b). See generally Freed, supra note 46 at 1689-91 (discussing steps Con-
gress took in eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparity); Thomas J. Meier,
Comment, A Proposal to Resolve the Interpretation of "Mixture or Substance"
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 84 J. CRnm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377,
379-82 (1993) (discussing the goals of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
53. Section 994 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides significant
direction for the Commission to consider when drafting guidelines. Congress
requires consideration of the nature and degree of harm that the offense caused
and community concerns about the gravity of the offense. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c).
The Commission also must consider comments made by representatives of the
federal criminal justice system and by defendants. Id. §§ 994(o), (s). Other
provisions require the Commission to collect sentencing data and to incorporate
that data when drafting the Guidelines. Id. §§ 994(m), (w), 995(a). Congress
prohibited the maximum range of imprisonment for sentencing categories from
exceeding the minimum range by more than 25%. Id. § 994(b)(2).
54. Section 994(x) of Title 28 of the United States Code requires that the
Guidelines comply with applicable Administrative Procedure Act requirements.
Section 994(p) requires that proposed Guidelines survive a 180-day note and
comment period in which Congress may reject or tacitly accept them. By using
this approach, Congress granted the Commission, rather than reserving for it-
self, authority to formulate long-term Guidelines policy.
[Vol. 80:469478
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Because the Commission promulgates guidelines that de-
rive from an express congressional delegation of authority,55 the
Guidelines are akin to legislative rules that traditional agencies
promulgate. 56 In carrying out its policymaking duties in the
sentencing area, the Commission interprets its Guidelines in
commentaries. 57
The Supreme Court, in Stinson v. United States,58 declared
that the Commission's interpretive commentary is authoritative
unless it violates a federal statute or the Constitution.59 The
Court emphasized, however, that unlike traditional agency
rulemaking, the Guidelines commentary is not the product of
congressionally delegated authority.60 Rather, commentary ex-
plains the Guidelines and guides the courts in applying them.61
The commentary to the Guidelines, therefore, is functionally
equivalent to a traditional agency's interpretation of its own leg-
islative rules. 62 As a result, the Stinson Court declared, even a
prior judicial construction of a Guideline provision cannot pre-
vent the Commission from adopting a conflicting interpreta-
tion.63 This comports with a traditional agency's authority to
55. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1). See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989) (discussing the nondelegation doctrine implicit in the
principle of separation of powers).
56. Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1919 (1993). See also 28
U.S.C. § 994(x) (imposing the traditional note and comment rulemaking re-
quirements, which the Administrative Procedure Act mandates under 5 U.S.C.
§ 553, on the Commission's rulemaking authority); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 384-
85, 395 (noting that the Sentencing Commission engages in rulemaking as a
Judicial Branch agency, wielding the rulemaking power of an agency rather
than the adjudicatory power that judges traditionally exercise when passing
sentence); Sunstein, supra note 22, at 2093 (defining a legislative rule as one
"issued by an agency pursuant to a congressional grant of power to promulgate
regulations").
57. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 165-67, 178 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3348-50; 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)-(3) (permitting the
Commission to promulgate policy statements and commentary in its efforts to
periodically modify the Guidelines).
58. 113 S. Ct. 1913 (1993).
59. Id. at 1915.
60. Id. at 1918.
61. Id.
62. Courts must treat the Commission's commentary "like legislative his-
tory... that helps determine the intent of a drafter." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7, cmt.
63. Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1919 (1993). Amended com-
mentary also is binding on the federal courts, even though it is not reviewed by
Congress. Id.
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change the law when confronted with a new development in its
area of expertise.64
Additionally, Congress intends the Commission's authority
to amend the Guidelines to be the primary means of resolving
intercircuit conflicts over the interpretation of the Guidelines. 65
The Commission's amendment power extends both to the Guide-
lines and to the accompanying commentary.66 The Commis-
sion's amendment authority is the equivalent of Congress's
authority to amend ambiguous statutory provisions.67
Unfortunately, judicial resistance to the Guidelines, 68
spurred by their mandatory nature,69 has partially frustrated
64. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing an agency's abil-
ity to interpret recent developments).
65. The SRA's legislative history reveals congressional intent that the
Commission "determine whether the guidelines are being effectively imple-
mented and to revise them if for some reason they fail to achieve their pur-
poses." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 178 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3361; see also Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348
(1991) (explaining that "Congress necessarily contemplated that the Commis-
sion would... make whatever clarifying revisions to the Guidelines conflicting
judicial decisions might suggest"); see also Wilkins & Steer, supra note 39, at 73
(arguing that "Braxton represents a fundamentally pragmatic view that the
Commission, as the source of the sentencing law embodied in the guidelines,
ultimately is in the best position to know how it intended that law to be inter-
preted and applied").
66. See Wilkins & Steer, supra note 39, at 76 (providing an example of the
Commission's amendment power). Wilkins and Steer explain that the Commis-
sion in one case responded to conflicting court interpretations of statutory felon-
in-possession offenses and "career offender" Guideline provisions by amending
section 4B1.2 of the Guidelines and its accompanying commentary. Id. (citing
U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 433, 461).
67. See Braxton, 500 U.S. at 347-48.
68. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 142 (1990) (noting that 266 out of 270 respondents
to a survey favored amending the Guidelines to make them "general standards"
rather than "compusory rules"); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, TENTA-
TIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT 60-65 (1989) (explaining that
"the Sentencing Guidelines have significantly increased the federal courts'
workload"); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1989) (noting
that over 200 district judges held the SRA unconstitutional); Lay, supra note
44, at 1768 (noting that many judges seek the SRA's "outright repeal").
69. The Supreme Court noted that "the Guidelines bind judges and courts
in the exercise of their uncontested responsibility to pass sentence in criminal
cases." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 391 (1989). If judges depart
from the range of sentences that the Guidelines specify, courts must stipulate
the "specific reason" for that departure. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). During congres-
sional debate over technical SRA amendments, the Senate rejected House ef-
forts to add language to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that would allow courts to impose
sentences sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with sentencing
purposes. 133 CONG. REC. S16,644-48 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987). One commen-
tator likens the Guidelines to "administrative handcuffs." Freed, supra note 46,
480
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the realization of the Guidelines' purposes. 70 Moreover, con-
gressional input in the mandatory minimum sentence area 71
fosters debate over the Guidelines' authoritative reach. Con-
gressional action imposing harsh and inflexible drug-related
sentences arguably contradicts the Guidelines' purposes of sen-
tencing proportionality and uniformity.72 The Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986 provides one example of this controversial congres-
sional involvement in the federal sentencing process.
at 1697. Another commentator argues that the Guidelines' restrictive nature
emanates from a misguided perception that their enactment intended to elimi-
nate all disparate sentencing by imposing a rigid system of rules on the courts.
Lay, supra note 44, at 1756 n.5.
But see United States v. Helton, 975 F.2d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1992), which
notes that sentencing departure decisions are wholly within a district court's
discretion.
70. See Senator Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The
United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the
Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
185, 190 (1993) (noting that the Guidelines have not eradicated completely pre-
SRA sentencing disparities); Lay, supra note 44, at 1762 (noting that "[tihe
guidelines have done nothing more than provide a negative contribution to a
serious societal problem"); Wilkins & Steer, supra note 39, at 75 (noting that
courts' differing guideline interpretations lead to "pockets" of disparate guide-
line sentencing).
71. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100
Stat. 3207-2 to 3207-4 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1) (A)-(D) (1988)); see also
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM,
app. A (1991) (listing mandatory minimum sentence statutes) [hereinafter
MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT].
72. See, e.g., United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 468 (1st Cir. 1994)
(Breyer, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that a mandatory minimum sentence repre-
sents an "ad hoc deviation" from the Guidelines' goals); MANDATORY MINIMUM
REPORT, supra note 71, at 44 (noting Commission findings that defendants
whose conduct warranted mandatory minimum sentences only received those
sentences approximately 54% of the time); supra note 50 and accompanying
text (discussing the Guidelines' uniform sentencing goal); see also Hatch, supra
note 70, at 194-95 (noting Judicial Conference and Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee findings that mandatory minimum sentences "may be dramatically un-
dermining sentencing certainty"); Lay, supra note 44, at 1764-65 (arguing that
by enacting mandatory minimum sentences, Congress undermined some SRA
objectives); Wright, supra note 20, at 78 (arguing that "[s]tatutes containing
new mandatory minima may constitute the single largest threat by Congress to
administrative development of sentencing guidelines").
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2. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198673 seeks, in part, to tailor
drug sentencing to drug quantities attributed to a defendant. 74
The Act imposes mandatory minimum sentences that corre-
spond to the weight of a "mixture or substance containing a de-
tectable amount" of a controlled substance.75 Concern about
major drug traffickers who create and market large quantities of
diluted drugs led Congress to fashion the Act's mandatory mini-
mum sentence provisions.76 Congress therefore targeted the
quantity of a distributed substance, and not the purity of the
drug, in its initiative.77 This "market-oriented" approach 78 in
the mandatory minimum sentencing area arguably conflicts
with the Guidelines' purposes.79 Moreover, the Act's practical
effect is to severely restrict the Sentencing Commission's au-
thority over drug sentencing.80
Enacted at a time when the nation's anti-drug sentiments
had reached their pinnacle,81 the Anti-Drug Abuse Act repre-
73. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841
(b)(1)(A)-(D) (1988)).
74. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)-(C).
75. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (discussing the sentencing
statute's mandatory minimum penalty imposition); infra notes 85-92 and ac-
companying text (discussing the current Supreme Court interpretation); infra
note 79 (discussing the disproportionality in sentencing created by mandatory
minimum sentences).
76. H.R. REP. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 11-12 (1986).
77. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991).
78. H.R. REP. No. 845, supra note 76, at 11-12, 17.
79. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act and its market-oriented approach essentially
creates a dual calculation method with respect to certain controlled substances.
Calculation of drug weight for defendants who have not triggered the sentenc-
ing statute is governed by the Guidelines. Calculation of drug weight for a de-
fendant under the sentencing statute, however, includes the entire weight of
the mixture or substance, including any carrier medium. See MANDATORY MINI-
mum REPORT, supra note 71, summary. "Whereas guidelines seek a smooth con-
tinuum, mandatory minimums result in 'cliffs.' The 'cliffs' that result from
mandatory minimums compromise proportionality, a fundamental premise for
just punishment, and a primary goal of the Sentencing Reform Act." Id. at iii.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing the Guidelines' purposes
of providing federal sentencing proportionality and uniformity).
80. See Ronnie M. Scotkin, The Development of the Federal Sentencing
Guideline for Drug Trafficking Offenses, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 50, 52 (1990) (ex-
plaining that the "minimum sentencing provisions.., effectively restricted the
Commission's discretion in establishing guidelines for drug trafficking
offenses").
81. One legislator's 1986 remarks are indicative of the congressional mood
surrounding the enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act: "The widespread use
of illegal drugs is one of the most pressing problems facing our society. Illegal
drugs are killing children and destroying families. Vast profits from the sale of
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sents a distinct, yet controversial8 2 congressional policy that dif-
fers from the goals of the Guidelines.8 3 In fact, the Supreme
Court noted that the assumption that the Guidelines are rele-
vant to the interpretation of a sentencing statute is "dubious."8 4
Lower courts, however, often face the challenge of reconciling
sentencing statutes and Commission Guidelines that may ap-
pear similar, but that differ in substance.8 5 The Supreme Court
addressed this issue in Chapman v. United States.
C. Czv'Pwr V. UNITED STATES
In Chapman v. United States, the Supreme Court inter-
preted the phrase "mixture or substance" in the drug sentencing
context.8 6 The Chapman Court held that blotter paper contain-
ing LSD is includable in a drug's weight under 21 U.S.C. § 841
and for sentencing purposes.8 7 The Court, after stating that
"[n]either the statute nor the Sentencing Guidelines define the
terms 'mixture' or 'substance,'" 88 applied a dictionary definition
to the term.8 9 The Court reasoned that applying the term's
illegal drugs have created a new criminal underworld which promotes violence
and feeds on death." 132 CONG. REC. S14,282 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (state-
ment of Sen. Kennedy); see also Drug Arrests Put Prisons in a Pinch, USA To-
DAY, Sept. 1, 1992, at A4 (noting that drug arrests in the United States more
than doubled over the period 1980 to 1991).
82. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting general dissatisfac-
tion with mandatory minimum sentences).
83. See MANDATORY MImnum REPoRT, supra note 71, at 8 (describing the
1986 Drug Abuse Act as representative of the trend toward mandatory mini-
mum sentences, which is separate from the effort to establish sentencing
guidelines).
84. Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2055 (1993). Smith dealt with
the interpretation of the "use" of a firearm in the context of a penalty-enhancing
statute for drug trafficking. Id. at 2053. Justice Scalia, dissenting, referred to a
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines and its commentary for guidance in de-
termining the meaning of the term "use," id. at 2061, but the majority rejected
the Guidelines' relevance. Id. at 2055.
85. See United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 468 (1st Cir. 1994)
(Breyer, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that a mandatory minimum sentence repre-
sents an "ad hoc deviation" from the Guidelines' goals); United States v. Young,
34 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that Congress did not intend to employ stat-
utory sentencing provisions that are completely at odds with the Guidelines'
approach).
86. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
87. Id. at 461-62.
88. Id.
89. The Court defined a "mixture" as "a portion of matter consisting of two
or more components that do not bear a fixed proportion to one another and that
however thoroughly commingled are regarded as retaining a separate exist-
ence." Id. at 462 (quoting WEBSTER'S Tumn NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY
1449 (1986)). The Court further declared that a "mixture" may consist of two
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plain meaning90 corresponds to Congress's intent to punish drug
dealers based on a solicited drug's "street weight."91 The Court
referred to the legislative history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, which indicated Congress's desire for a "market-oriented"
approach to punishing drug offenders.92 The Court supported
its interpretation by noting that blotter paper facilitates LSD
distribution through easy concealment, transport, and
marketability. 93
Chapman, however, marked merely the beginning of the in-
terpretive controversy. Circuit court decisions demonstrate not
only that the intent of Congress and the Sentencing Commission
in using the phrase "mixture or substance" remains unclear, but
also that the Chapman Court's precise holding remains vulnera-
ble to judicial manipulation. 94 Circuit courts generally follow
blended substances in which one substance's particles are diffused among the
other substance's particles. Id. (citing 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 921 (2d
ed. 1989).
90. Id. This Comment uses the term "plain meaning" in the same context
as courts use the terms "ordinary meaning," "literal interpretation," or "diction-
ary meaning."
91.
By measuring the quantity of the drugs according to the "street
weight" of the drugs in the diluted form in which they are sold, rather
than according to the net weight of the active component, the statute
and the Sentencing Guidelines increase the penalty for persons who
possess large quantities of drugs, regardless of their purity. That is a
rational sentencing scheme.
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991).
92. Under the "market-oriented" approach to drug sentencing, a distrib-
uted substance's total quantity, and not the pure drug itself, is the determining
weight measure. Id. at 461. The rationale for this approach is that "Congress
did not want to punish retail traffickers less severely, even though they deal in
smaller quantities of the pure drug, because such traffickers keep the street
markets going." Id. The Court ultimately decided that "Congress had a ra-
tional basis for its choice of penalties for LSD distribution" since "the statute
and the Sentencing Guidelines increase the penalty for persons who possess
large quantities of drugs, regardless of their purity." Id. at 465.
93. Id. at 466.
94. See United States v. Stoneking, 34 F.3d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1994), reh'g
en banc granted, vacated, 60 F.3d 399 (8th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed,
(Jul. 28, 1995) (No. 95-5410) (arguing that the Supreme Court based Chap-
man's holding, in part, on the Sentencing Guidelines as they existed prior to
Amendment 488); cf. United States v. Pirnat, 859 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (E.D. Va.
1994) (noting that plain meaning alone does not indicate precisely what weight
standard governs LSD mixtures' total weight calculation). Compare United
States v. Innie, 7 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3691
(U.S. Apr. 18, 1994) (No. 93-8198) (holding that congressional adoption of a
market oriented approach to punishing drug possession warrants a plain mean-
ing interpretation, even as applied to nonmarketable substances) with United
States v. Palacios-Molina, 7 F.3d 49, 54 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that in light of
484
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one of three approaches in interpreting "mixture or sub-
stance."95 The First and Tenth Circuits apply a plain meaning
interpretation to the term.96 The Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits focus on the purpose of a carrier medium
when determining whether to include it in the drug weight cal-
culation.9 7 Finally, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits condition
drug weight calculation on whether the carrier itself is ingest-
ible along with the drug.98
Congress's market oriented approach, courts must base culpability only on the
amount of usable drug mixtures brought to the market).
95. For a thorough examination of the post-Chapman "mixture or sub-
stance" circuit split, see generally Douglas J. Quivey, Note, Market-Oriented
Approach to Determining Drug Quantity Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 653, 673-83.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124, 1127 (1st Cir.) (on
rehearing), cert. dismissed, 504 U.S. 980, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 484 (1992)
(including two suitcases' weight in the total weight calculation for punishing a
cocaine offense); United States v. Restrepo-Contreras, 942 F.2d 96, 99 (1st Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1066 (1992) (including 11 wax statues' weight in
the total weight calculation for punishing a cocaine offense); United States v.
Killion, 7 F.3d 927, 935 (10th Cir. 1993) cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1106 (1994)
(including the total weight of "yellow liquid" and a "dark brown substance" in
the weight calculation for punishing a Phenyl-2-Propanone offense).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Palacios-Molina, 7 F.3d 49,53 (5th Cir. 1993)
(refusing to include an "innocuous liquid" in the total weight of a mixture con-
taining distilled cocaine because the defendant intended to market only the co-
caine, and not the liquid); United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999, 1005 (3d
Cir. 1992) (refusing to include boric acid in the total weight of a mixture con-
taining the acid and cocaine because the acid did not facilitate the drug's distri-
bution); United States v. Davern, 970 F.2d 1490, 1492 n.2 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1289 (1993) (noting that the weight of plaster of Paris that is
combined with cocaine is not includable in cocaine's weight calculation because
it is a packaging material); United States v. Robins, 967 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th
Cir. 1992) (refusing to include cornmeal in the weight of a cornmeal-cocaine
mixture because the cornmeal did not facilitate the drug's distribution); United
States v. Acosta, 963 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1992) (refusing to include creme
liqueur's weight in cocaine's weight calculation because cocaine users must sep-
arate the liquer from the cocaine prior to use); cf Innie, 7 F.3d at 847 (including
the weight of liquid containing methamphetamine in a weight calculation be-
cause the entire mixture facilitates the drug's distribution).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1197 (7th Cir. 1993)
(refusing to include in a weight calculation a waste water byproduct containing
cocaine because the water is not ingestible and therefore not marketable);
United States v. Bristol, 964 F.2d 1088, 1089-90 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)
(refusing to include the weight of a quantity of wine containing cocaine because
the "ultimate user" could not consume the wine prior to separating it from the
drug). But see Ambriz v. United States, 14 F.3d 331, 333-34 (7th Cir. 1994)
(including the weight of dirt mixed with cocaine because the defendant believed
cocaine comprised the full weight of the mixture that he purchased from federal
drug agents).
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To support their conclusions in drug sentencing cases,
courts must reconcile congressional intent, the purposes of fed-
eral sentencing, and the reasoning in Chapman.99 Courts that
have diverged from the Chapman's plain meaning interpreta-
tion of "mixture or substance" have attempted to support their
decisions with both language from Chapman and with independ-
ent reasoning that seems to contradict Chapman.100
Following the promulgation of Amendment 488, the circuits
once again split over the interpretation of "mixture or sub-
stance." In United States v. Stoneking, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals initially held that Amendment 488 overrode Chap-
man's interpretation of the sentencing statute. 0 1 The Eighth
Circuit, however, subsequently vacated its decision in order to
rehear the case en banc.'02 Adding to the confusion, the First,
Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have held that Amendment
488 does not apply to weight determinations under the sentenc-
ing statute. 03 United States v. Muschik demonstrates a differ-
99.
Congress intended, at the time it enacted the [minimum mandatory
sentence] statute... that the pivotal term "mixture or substance con-
taining a detectable amount" of controlled substance required the sen-
tencing court to include the entire weight of the LSD and its carrier
mediu...... Until the Supreme Court or the Congress revisits the
issue, Chapman governs the meaning of the term "mixture or sub-
stance" in 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(B)(v) ....
United States v. Boot, 25 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
For a thorough discussion of problems in discerning and relying on legisla-
tive intent, see Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and
Public Choice, 74 VA. L. Rxv. 423, 425-37, 453-61 (1988).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Muschik, 49 F.3d 512, 516 (9th Cir. 1995),
petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 25, 1995) (No. 95-156) (rea-
soning that Amendment 488 remains true to the Chapman mandate but also
strengthens the theoretical foundation of the Chapman rationale); United
States v. Stoneking, 34 F.3d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1994), reh'g en banc granted,
vacated, 60 F.3d 399 (8th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, (July 28, 1995) (No.
95-5410) (reasoning that because Chapman deals only with mandatory mini-
mum sentences, Amendment 488's intent must be to conform sentences under
the statute and the Sentencing Guidelines).
101. 34 F.3d at 654.
102. Id. at 655.
103. These courts hold that the mandatory minimum statute trumps
Amendment 488. United States v. Reddick, 53 F.3d 462, 464 (2nd Cir. 1995);
United States v. Andress, 47 F.3d 839, 840 (6th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); United
States v. Neal, 46 F.3d 1405, 1408 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct.
2576 (1995); United States v. Dimeo, 28 F.3d 240, 241 (1st Cir. 1994); United
States v. Pirnat, 859 F.Supp. 995, 1002 (E.D.Va. 1994). But cf United States v.
McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 467-68 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, C.J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that Guideline amendments trump even the mandatory minimum sentence
statute, which is an "ad hoc deviation" from federal sentencing goals).
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ent court's decision to avoid a perceived injustice in mandatory
minimum sentencing, and provides an illustration of the post-
Chapman circuit split over the "mixture or substance" interpre-
tation problem.104
H. UNITED STATES V. MUSCHIK: ADDRESSING THE
POST-CHAPMAN CONTROVERSY
In United States v. Muschik, Richard Lee Muschik appealed
his conviction under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 for conspir-
ing to distribute LSD.10 5 The United States District Court for
the District of Montana imposed a twenty-year sentence due to
Muschik's prior felony drug conviction.10 6 Later, in November
1993, Amendment 488 to the Federal Sentencing Guideline
2D1.1 modified the LSD weight calculation method under which
the court imposed Muschik's sentence.107
The district court, despite the United States Probation Of-
fice's recalculation under Amendment 488 of the weight of the
LSD that Muschik sold,108 reimposed on remand the same
twenty-year sentence on Muschik.10 9 The district court's deci-
sion apparently rested on the court's belief that the sentencing
statute continued to require the inclusion of the carrier medium
in the weight calculation, notwithstanding Amendment 488.110
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, concluded that
Amendment 488 and the statute do not conflict. 111 The court
sought to avoid a "nonuniform and unfair result"1 2 and imposed
a sentence below that which the sentencing statute otherwise
required.
104. Compare United States v. Muschik, 49 F.3d 512, 518 (9th Cir. 1995),
petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 25, 1995) (No. 95-156) (hold-
ing that Amendment 488 applies even in the mandatory minimum sentence
area) with United States v. Boot, 25 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that
Amendment 488 does not apply to LSD calculations in the mandatory minimum
sentence area).
105. Muschik, 49 F.3d at 513.
106. Id. In order to comply with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) the court must
double Muschik's mandatory minimum sentence term because he had a prior
state felony drug conviction.
107. See U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1(c).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14 (describing the recalculation
of the weight of LSD that Muschik sold).
109. United States v. Muschik, 49 F.3d 512, 514 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 25, 1995) (No. 95-156).
110. Id. at 514-15.
111. Id. at 515.
112. Id. at 518.
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The Muschik court based its decision on the Eighth Circuit's
reasoning in United States v. Stoneking,i13 but disregarded the
fact that the Eighth Circuit subsequently vacated its decision in
order to rehear the case en banc.114 The Muschik court an-
nounced that, where a statute and the Guidelines conflict, the
statutory sentence controls.11 5 The court's analysis, however,
distinguishes calculation of the weight of LSD from the applica-
tion of the sentencing statute. Under Muschik's post-Chapman
approach, the Guidelines first apply to the weight determination
and next the statutory minimum governs the applicable
sentence.
The Muschik court distinguished the Supreme Court's prior
calculation of the weight of LSD in Chapman. The Muschik
court concluded that Chapman's "mixture or substance" diction-
ary definition, 116 as applied to the sentencing statute at that
time, derived from the lack of a unifying weight measure in the
Guidelines and the statute.11 7 The court reasoned that the
Chapman Court faced only two choices. The Court could recal-
culate the negligible net weight of pure LSD or it could calculate
the gross weight of the pure LSD together with the carrier me-
dium.'18 Constrained by the Guidelines' market-oriented ap-
proach, the Chapman Court felt compelled (said Muschik) to
choose the gross weight.119 The court then maintained that
Amendment 488 provides a third option for courts, not available
at the time of Chapman, of using a predesignated rational
weight in calculating sentences.1 -20
113. "[T]his precise issue has already been addressed .... We find the rea-
soning of the Eighth Circuit... persuasive and herein adopt it for our own." Id.
at 515. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth
Circuit's reasoning in Stoneking).
114. "Regardless of the Eighth Circuit's eventual decision in this case, we
remain impressed by the reasoning expressed in the original opinion." United
States v. Muschik, 49 F.3d 512, 515 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995),petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 25, 1995) (No. 95-156).
115. Id. at 515.
116. The court noted the Supreme Court's "mixture" definition as "a portion
of matter consisting of two or more components that do not bear a fixed propor-
tion to one another and that however thoroughly commingled are regarded as
retaining a separate existence." Id. at 515 n.5 (citing Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991)).
117. Id. at 515.
118. Id. at 516.
119. United States v. Muschik, 49 F.3d 512, 516 (9th Cir. 1995),petition for
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 25, 1995) (No. 95-156).
120. Id.
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Far from overriding the Chapman interpretation of "mix-
ture or substance," the court believed Amendment 488 provides
a standardized weight for carrier-mixed doses of LSD.121 The
court maintained that Amendment 488 thus conforms to the
Chapman mandate by including the carrier weight in the calcu-
lation and by maintaining the "market-oriented" approach to
drug sentencing.122 By standardizing the weight of a dose of
LSD, the court stated, the Sentencing Commission furthered the
"market-oriented" approach because dealers sell LSD by doses
rather than weight.1 23 The court reasoned that the amendment
continues to punish retail traffickers by establishing a LSD
weight figure eight times higher than that of the pure drug.124
The Muschik court next addressed the Sentencing Commis-
sion's purported intent in promulgating Amendment 488. The
court found that the Commission intended to correct the dispro-
portionate sentencing of LSD defendants, who incurred severe
punishments for selling a less dangerous controlled substance
than many other dealers. 25
Finally, the court addressed Congress's apparent acquies-
cence in Amendment 488's promulgation. The court maintained
that by allowing the Commission to refine the LSD sentencing
scheme without challenging the amendment, 26 Congress chose
to implement a single policy comprising both mandatory mini-
mum sentencing and the Guidelines sentencing scheme. 12 7 The
court criticized the First,128 Fifth,129 and Seventh' 30 Circuits for
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 516-17.
124. United States v. Muschik, 49 F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 25, 1995) (No. 95-156).
125. Id. The court noted that prior to Amendment 488's enactment, LSD
dealers incurred disproportionate sentences in relation to phencyclidine (PCP)
dealers, whose drug of choice is much more dangerous. Id.
126. Id.
127. "We should not assume that Congress has made conflicting policy deci-
sions regarding LSD weight in the areas of mandatory minimum and Guideline
sentencing when those decisions may be so easily harmonized." Id.
128. Id. See United States v. Boot, 25 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating
that "Congress simply acquiesced in the restrictive reach of Amendment 488
duly noted by the Commission").
129. United States v. Muschik, 49 F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 25, 1995) (No. 95-156). See United
States v. Pardue, 36 F.3d 429,431 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1969 (1995) (maintaining that adherance to the "does not override" lan-
guage of the Background Commentary of Section 2D1.1(c) of the Guidelines dis-
allows the use of 'the mandatory minimum of § 841, calculated according to
Chapman").
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misinterpreting the amendment's background commentary. 13 '
The Muschik court contended that those circuits perpetuate a
dual system of LSD weight calculation and continue to frustrate
sentencing uniformity and fairness.-3 2
The Muschik court concluded that the weight of the LSD
that Muschik sold, calculated in accordance with Amendment
488's standards, subjected him to a mandatory minimum sen-
tence of ten years. 13 3 The court accordingly vacated the district
court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing consis-
tent with its opinion.'34
III. IN MUSCHIKS WAKE: REEVALUATING THE
SENTENCING COMMISSION'S INTERPRETIVE
AUTHORITY AND INVITING CONGRESS
AND THE COURTS TO REVISE
PAST INTERPRETATIONS
In concluding that Amendment 488 controls the measure of
LSD for mandatory minimum sentencing purposes, the Muschik
court made three critical errors. The court failed to adhere to
traditional interpretive canons by holding that the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the sentencing statute no longer gov-
erns the measure of weight in that statute. The court also failed
to recognize the self-limiting nature of Amendment 488.
Amendment 488 cannot remedy the perceived inequities of the
dual system of LSD weight measure in the mandatory minimum
sentencing area that Congress and the Chapman Court pro-
duced. The court, moreover, misinterpreted Congress's inaction
in allowing Amendment 488 to become effective following the
statutorily-mandated 180-day waiting period after its promulga-
tion. An analysis of the Sentencing Commission's role under ad-
ministrative law principles reveals the Muschik court's flawed
reasoning.
The Muschik decision, however, illuminates a positive de-
velopment in federal sentencing. The Sentencing Commission
appears committed to conforming drug sentences with the
Guidelines' overarching goals of uniformity and proportionality.
130. Muschik, 49 F.3d at 517. See United States v. Neal, 46 F.3d 1405, 1408
(7th Cir. ) (en banc), and cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995) (noting that the
Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 488 in full recognition that it
would create a "dual weight" system).
131. Muschik, 49 F.3d at 517.
132. See id. at 517-18.
133. Id. at 518.
134. Id.
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Amendment 488 remedies the prior dual system of LSD weight
measure where mandatory minimum sentences do not apply.
Amendment 488 also may serve as the catalyst for Congress or
the Supreme Court to change the calculation of LSD weight for
mandatory minimum sentencing purposes.
A. THE MUSCHIK COURT ASSIGNED EXCESSIVE INTERPRETIVE
AuTiORITY TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING COIiSSION
The Muschik court's analysis focused on the purported via-
bility of reading Amendment 488 and the Chapman decision in
harmony. This approach is both unnecessary and improper in
light of the Chapman Court's definitive interpretation of the
"mixture or substance" term that the Muschik court believed the
amendment clarifies. The Muschik court, moreover, dismissed
the Commission's own recognition of its inability to alter the
Chapman interpretation. Finally, the Muschik court misinter-
preted Congress's failure to comment on Amendment 488 before
the amendment took effect.
1. Amendment 488 Cannot Control the Measure of LSD for
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Purposes Because it
Would Contradict a Prior Supreme Court Interpretation
The Federal Sentencing Commission routinely formulates
drug sentencing policy in accordance with its congressional
mandate.' 35 The Commission also clarifies or amends its prior
drug sentencing policies if these changes do not contradict gov-
erning statutes. 136 The Commission enjoys wide latitude in for-
mulating sentencing policy through the Guidelines and
commentary, just as traditional agencies enjoy wide latitude in
promulgating rules under administrative law theories.137 These
same theories, however, also constrain the Commission's au-
thority. The Supreme Court, in Chapman, definitively settled
the "mixture or substance" question with respect to the sentenc-
ing statute. 3 8 As a result, the Commission, whose primary goal
135. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (describing the Sentenc-
ing Commission's authority to promulgate sentencing guidance).
136. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Commis-
sion's apparent authority).
137. See supra notes 22-25, 53-67 and accompanying text (describing gener-
ally the role of agencies and the Sentencing Commission).
138. See 500 U.S. 453, 462 (1991) (holding that the term "mixture or sub-
stance" in U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) includes the carrier medium).
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is to ensure sentencing fairness,' 3 9 retained only limited inter-
pretive authority in promulgating Amendment 488.
At the time the Supreme Court decided Chapman, neither
the sentencing statute nor the Guidelines defined the term "mix-
ture or substance."140 As a result of the Guidelines' lack of gui-
dance as to the meaning of this term, the Court provided its own
definition of the term.14 ' After defining the term using a plain
meaning interpretation, 42 the Court settled the "mixture or
substance" controversy with respect to the sentencing statute.
The Court unequivocally held that courts must include the
weight of blotter paper in the calculation of the LSD weight
where mandatory minimum sentences are involved. 143 There-
fore, two years later, when the Commission promulgated
Amendment 488, no interpretive gap remained with respect to
the sentencing statute. The Chapman interpretation of the
"mixture or substance" term effectively became part of the stat-
ute and ended debate with respect to the statute.'" Amend-
ment 488, accordingly, cannot apply to the weight calculations of
LSD under the sentencing statute.
Moreover, the Chevron doctrine dictates that the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines cannot disturb Chapman. That doctrine limits
an agency's authority to clarify those statutes the agency
promulgates. 145 The doctrine, furthermore, accords no judicial
deference to agency interpretations that conflict with prior judi-
cial interpretations or a governing statute.146
139. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (describing the Guidelines'
goals).
140. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 461-62 (1991).
141. Id. at 462.
142. Id. (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108-10 (1990)).
143. "[It is the weight of the blotter paper containing LSD, and not the
weight of the pure LSD, which determines eligibility for the minimum sen-
tence." Id. at 455.
144. See supra text accompanying note 27 (discussing the role of stare deci-
sis). In light of Congress's legislative intent to punish drug kingpins more
harshly, see Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1993), deference to
the Commission is particularly inappropriate in this case. See Sunstein, supra
note 22, at 2091 (arguing that "Chevron is inapplicable when the particular con-
text suggests that deference would be a poor reconstruction of congressional
desires").
145. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting the limited interpre-
tive authority of agencies).
146. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (indicating that agency
interpretations that conflict with judicial interpretations or governing statutes
are not binding).
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Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, furthermore, re-
flect distinct congressional policy choices in federal drug sen-
tencing147 and the Commission plays no role in the enactment of
these statutes. Accordingly, if Amendment 488 has any value, it
must be with respect to the Guidelines themselves, when no
mandatory minimum sentence is imposed.
2. The Sentencing Commission Recognized its Inability to
Alter LSD Calculation Under the Sentencing Statute
The Muschik court believed its holding to be consistent with
Chapman's interpretation of "mixture or substance." The court
rationalized this determination by noting that Amendment 488
continues to factor carrier weight into the formula.1 48 According
to the court, Amendment 488 merely standardizes the amount of
carrier medium that is "mixed" with pure LSD.149 The court
maintained that the Sentencing Commission sought to promote
equal treatment and fairness in sentencing by creating a uni-
form method of calculating LSD weight.150
The post-amendment commentary to Amendment 488, how-
ever, indicates that the Commission actually intended to further
a dual system of calculating LSD weight. The Commission rec-
ognized that the term "mixture or substance" in the sentencing
statute includes the carrier medium on which LSD is affixed. 151
The background commentary to Sentencing Guideline section
2D1.1(c), as modified by Amendment 488, expressly stipulates
that the new weight calculation method does not override the
147. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (noting congressional concern
over widespread drug commerce, usage, and the resulting enactment of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986).
148. United States v. Muschik, 49 F.3d 512, 516 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3086 (U.S. July 25, 1995) (No. 95-156).
149. Id. (noting that the Sentencing Commission assigned a sentencing
weight per dose that is eight times the actual weight of pure LSD) (citing
United States v. Stoneking, 34 F.3d 651, 654 (8th Cir. 1994), reh'g en banc
granted, vacated, 60 F.3d 399 (8th Cir. 1995), petition for cer. filed, (Jul. 28,
1995) (No. 95-5410)).
150. Id. at 518; see also id. at 517 (noting that the Commission "intended for
Amendment 488 to correct the pre-amendment situation wherein LSD
sentences were disproportionate to those sentences imposed for other, more
dangerous substances"). But cf United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 466
(1st Cir. 1994) (noting that the Guidelines do not alter 21 U.S.C., a "monolith of
a statute," that remained undisturbed when the Guidelines entered into effect);
Lay, supra note 44, at 1756 n.5 (noting that the Guidelines are not necessarily
designed to eliminate all sentencing disparity).
151. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 488.
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applicability of the term "mixture or substance" when the sen-
tencing statute applies. 152
An examination of the Commission's role in federal sentenc-
ing further supports the argument that Amendment 488 applies
only when the sentencing statute does not. The Commission's
primary mission is to promulgate guidelines and to remove the
varying discretion of the courts in federal sentencing.1 53 The
Commission also may provide commentary to the Guidelines to
help courts interpret them.154 Under Stinson v. United States,
however, this commentary is only authoritative with respect to
the Guidelines, which are the functional equivalent of a tradi-
tional agency's legislative rules. 155 The commentary cannot
carry authoritative weight with respect to an overriding
statute.1 5
6
Courts that allow the Guidelines commentary explaining
Amendment 488 to override the sentencing statute violate Stin-
son. This is a result that the Sentencing Commission did not
and should not have anticipated when it wrote Amendment 488
and the commentary. In fact, the Guidelines themselves indi-
cate that "[wihere a statutorily required minimum sentence is
greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the
statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline
sentence."' 57
While the proper interpretation of Amendment 488 fosters a
dual method for calculation of the weight of LSD, this approach
is not necessarily inconsistent with the purpose of the sentenc-
ing statute. By permitting the sentencing statute to continue to
punish more harshly drug "kingpins" who deal in high "street
weights" of diluted drugs, 158 whatever their form, Amendment
488 yields to a rational, albeit controversial, 159 congressional
152. "[Tlhis approach does not override the applicability of 'mixture or sub-
stance' for the purpose of applying any mandatory minimum sentence (see
Chapman; § 5G1.1(b))." U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (backg'd.).
153. See supra notes 42, 52 and accompanying text (explaining the Commis-
sion's main function is to provide functional guidelines to be followed).
154. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (indicating that the Com-
mission has interpretive power over the Guidelines it issues).
155. See supra notes 56, 62 and accompanying text (likening the Commis-
sion's control over the Guidelines to that of an agency's control).
156. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (noting that a Guideline is
not authoritative if it violates a federal statute or the Constitution).
157. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b).
158. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's
intent that mandatory minimum sentencing be imposed on these "kingpins").
159. For a graphic illustration of the controversial sentencing disparity that
the sentencing statute fosters, see United States v. Neal, 46 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir.)
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policy choice.1 60 Because the Commission recognizes that Con-
gress sometimes purposefully seeks a dual calculation
method, 161 courts must read Amendment 488 as reafrming the
Commission's adherence to Congress's wishes.
3. Congressional Acquiescence to Amendment 488 Did Not
Extend to the Amendment's Application to the
Sentencing Statute
In directing the Sentencing Commission to review and re-
vise the Sentencing Guidelines periodically, Congress antici-
pates that the Commission will clarify the Guidelines and
remedy conflicting judicial decisions. 162 According to the Mus-
chik court, Congress acquiesced not only to the Commission's
clarification of the proper weight measure of LSD, but also to the
weight measure's application to the sentencing statute.163 By
failing to take action during the statutorily-mandated 180-day
review period, the court reasoned, Congress agreed that Amend-
ment 488 establishes a unitary measure of weight with regard to
the sentencing statute.164 Arguably, Congress should have fore-
seen the potential for the tortured interpretation of Amendment
488 that surfaced in Muschik. More likely, however, Congress,
like the majority of circuit courts that addressed this issue,' 65
merely predicted the amendment's limited application outside of
(en banc), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995). In Neal, the weight attributed
to the defendant under the unitary method of calculation amounted to only 4.58
grams of LSD with a corresponding sentencing range of 70 to 87 months. Id. at
1407. Under the dual calculation method, however, the total weight attributed
to him amounted to 109.51 grams with a corresponding sentencing range of 10
years. Id. The sole difference in the weight calculations and Neal's sentence
ultimately rested on his improvident choice to distribute LSD on blotter paper.
160. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting the Chapman Court's
determination that the "market-oriented" approach to drug sentencing and the
sentencing statute represents a rational policy choice).
161. See supra note 79 (noting that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act has created a
dual calculation method).
162. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Commission has perspective and authority to resolve problems in applying the
Guidelines).
163. "Congress did not challenge the revision. We should not assume that
Congress has made conflicting policy decisions regarding LSD weight in the ar-
eas of mandatory minimum and Guideline sentencing...." United States v.
Muschik, 49 F.3d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W.
3086 (U.S. July 25, 1995) (No. 95-156).
164. Id.
165. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (stating that the First, Sixth
and Seventh Circuits failed to find that Amendment 488 governs the measure of
LSD weight with regard to the sentencing statute).
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the mandatory minimum context. The noted congressional de-
sire to maintain a dual system of weight measure with respect to
mandatory minimum sentences makes this explanation even
more compelling. 166
Since the Supreme Court decided Chapman in 1991, Con-
gress has not amended the sentencing statute to change the
meaning of "mixture or substance." Congress's implicit approval
of the Chapman interpretation of "mixture or substance" further
indicates that Congress did not intend for the Commission's new
amendment to alter the two-year old interpretation of the sen-
tencing statute. Absent congressional action, therefore, the con-
tinued viability of the sentencing statute as an "ad hoc
deviation"167 from sentencing goals is unassailable.
B. AMENDmENT 488 AS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT: PROVIDING
A MORE UNIFORM APPROACH TO DRUG SENTENCING IN
LIGHT OF THE PURPOSES OF THE GUIDELINES
Muschik is indicative of circuit courts' continuing discontent
with mandatory minimum sentences and their displeasure with
the perceived inequities of drug sentencing. The question re-
mains, however, as to what function Amendment 488 serves if
not to alter LSD weight calculation for mandatory minimum
sentence purposes. Courts should view Amendment 488 as a re-
newed attempt by the Sentencing Commission to conform drug
sentences with the Guidelines' overarching goals where the sen-
tencing statute does not apply.
Between the two rules for carrier medium weight estab-
lished by Chapman and Amendment 488, the amendment's uni-
form approach seems preferable in light of the Guidelines'
purposes. Amendment 488's approach provides the dual bene-
fits of insuring a uniform and proportional LSD weight measure
and avoiding the hypothetically absurd and arbitrary sentencing
that the Chapman Court admitted its approach might pro-
duce. 168 The Muschik court recognized this more favorable
approach, as did the Commission in its amendment commen-
166. See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Mueller, 27 F.3d 494, 497 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that if Congress wishes
courts to waive mandatory minimum sentence provisions, it would clearly artic-
ulate that desire).
167. United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 467-68 (1st Cir. 1994)
(Breyer, C.J., dissenting) (deeming a mandatory minimum statute an "ad hoc
deviation" from the goals of federal sentencing).
168. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453,466 (1991) ("While hypotheti-
cal cases can be imagined involving very heavy carriers and very little LSD,
[Vol. 80:469
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
tary.16 9 Even courts that refuse to permit Amendment 488 to
override the sentencing statute1 70 have stated that "[tihe supe-
rior formula is the Guidelines' formula" 71 and suggested that
the sentencing statute is "an ill-advised policy."172
The Commission recognized the need to address the nation's
drug problem through stiff penalties. In doing so, it rejected rec-
ommendations to exclude, in whatever form, a carrier's weight
for sentencing purposes.1 73 Concerned merely with the continu-
ing inequities of drug sentencing, and not with the inflexible
penalties of mandatory minimum sentencing, the Commission
acted to remedy the disproportional sentences that the Guide-
lines imposed.' 7 4 Amendment 488 thus represents a positive
step toward aligning drug sentencing under the Guidelines with
the Guidelines' purposes.
The sentencing statute will continue to polarize courts be-
cause it will require the application of a different weight calcula-
tion method to those dealers falling within its reach.' 7 5
those cases are of no import in considering a claim by persons ... who used a
standard LSD carrier.").
169.
[T]he Commission has determined that basing offense levels on the en-
tire weight of the LSD and carrier medium would produce unwar-
ranted disparity among offenses involving the same quantity of actual
LSD (but different carrier weights), as well as sentences disproportion-
ate to those for other, more dangerous controlled substances such as
PCP. Consequently, in cases involving LSD contained in a carrier me-
dium, the Commission has established a weight per dose of 0.4 milli-
gram for purposes of determining the base offense level.... Thus, the
approach decided upon by the Commission will harmonize offense
levels for LSD offenses with those for other controlled substances and
avoid an undue influence of varied carrier weight on the applicable of-
fense level.
U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1, comment. (backg'd.).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Pirnat, 859 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (E.D. 1994)
("[Diespite the reduction in the Sentencing Guidelines range applicable to de-
fendant pursuant to amended § 2D1.1, defendant is still subject to the 120
month mandatory minimum sentence set forth at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(v).").
171. United States v. Hanlin, 48 F.3d 121, 125 (3rd Cir. 1995) ("The superior
formula is the Guidelines' formula because it recognizes that weighing the en-
tire carrier medium produces unwanted disparity among offenses involving the
same quantity of LSD .... ").
172. United States v. Neal, 46 F.3d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir.) (en bane) cert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 2576 (1995) (noting that mandatory minimum sentencing
"may be an ill-advised policy... [but that] [sluch judgments are for Congress,
not the courts, and we will not interfere with them").
173. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (n.18).
174. Id.
175. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (noting the very harsh sen-
tence imposed on the defendant in United States v. Neal that resulted from the
defendantis choice to distribute LSD on blotter paper).
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Amendment 488, however, now provides courts a uniform ap-
proach to drug sentencing where the weight of LSD involved
does not trigger the sentencing statute's harsher penalties. 176
Amendment 488, accordingly, serves a legitimate purpose be-
yond overturning the Chapman Court's "mixture or substance"
interpretation as applied to the sentencing statute.
C. BAD LAw As THE CATALYST FOR BETTER LAW:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RECONCILING THE GUIDELINES
AND THE SENTENCING STATUTE
Muschik represents more than merely one circuit court's at-
tempt to reconcile the competing interests of the Sentencing
Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences. Muschik indi-
cates that significant problems continue to plague the Sentenc-
ing Commission as it seeks to fulfill its congressional mandate.
By further clarifying Amendment 488's limited authoritative
scope, the Commission can signal its recognition of the limita-
tions that Congress placed on it. Congress, which created the
potential for controversy and confusion as to Amendment 488's
reach, can clarify its intentions in the mandatory minimum sen-
tencing area by rewording the sentencing statute. Finally, the
Supreme Court can circumvent the need for these two alterna-
tives by revisiting the "mixture or substance" controversy.
1. The Sentencing Commission Should Clarify Amendment
488's Limited Authoritative Reach
The Federal Sentencing Commission, constrained by con-
gressional limits on its authority and by its uneasy partnership
with the judiciary, 77 should reword Amendment 488. By clari-
fying the amendment's limited authoritative reach, the Commis-
176. See Neal, 46 F.3d at 1411 ("The Guidelines amendment creating a pre-
sumptive weight for purposes of calculating a defendant's base offense level, in
effect, cuts small scale dealers a break by making them eligible for shorter
sentences, and even probation."); United States v. Boot, 25 F.3d 52, 55 3L3 (1st
Cir. 1994) (noting that Amendment 488 eliminates considerable sentencing dis-
parity for offenders).
Amendment 488 provides more sentencing proportionality and fairness up
to the point that the weight attributed to a defendant triggers the harsher
mandatory minimum statute. Ultimately, this approach may produce the un-
foreseen problem of determining the point at which the court should cease cal-
culating weight under the Sentencing Guidelines formula and revert to
calculating the weight under the Chapman formula.
177. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (indicating judicial
discomfort with the Guidelines and congressional action exacerbating that
discomfort).
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sion will signal both its intention to comply with the limited
congressional mandate it enjoys and its understanding of the
role it plays in federal sentencing. The Commission should
clearly indicate that Amendment 488's weight calculation does
not apply in situations where the court must use the sentencing
statute.178 The rules of statutory superiority for agencies inter-
preting their own provisions when they contradict governing
statutes mandate such an approach. 179
2. Congress Should Clarify the Meaning of the Sentencing
Statute
Of the three actors who determine drug sentencing, Con-
gress is most guilty of perpetuating sentencing ambiguity. Con-
gress's penchant for vague statutory language,.80 combined with
the constraints that it imposes on the Sentencing Commis-
sion,18 3 inevitably leads to controversies like those that Muschik
and Chapman attempted to resolve. By interjecting itself into
the federal sentencing area, Congress subjected itself to criti-
cism from both the judiciary and sentencing authorities. 8 2 Con-
gress therefore must accept responsibility by remedying
problems that it helped to create.
Unfortunately, congressional action in this instance ap-
pears unlikely. Congress generally is unresponsive to the
Supreme Court's statutory decisions.' 8 3 Furthermore, when
Congress has acted to override 84 the Court through statutory
178. In this respect, the Commission may wish to reference the court's appli-
cation of Amendment 488 in United States v. Neal. The Neal court refused to
apply Amendment 488 because the defendant fell within the purview of the
sentencing statute. 46 F.3d 1405, 1410 (7th C.) (en banc) cert. granted, 115 S.
Ct. 2576 (1995).
179. Stinson v. United States indicates that the Commission's Guidelines in-
terpretation will have a binding effect unless the interpretation violates a fed-
eral statute. 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993); see supra note 25 and accompanying
text (discussing the courts' rejection of agency interpretations that conflict with
the Constitution or a governing statute).
180. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting Congress's refusal to
signal specific statutory meaning).
181. See supra notes 53, 71-72 and accompanying text (noting that congres-
sional requirements conflict with the Commissions aims).
182. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (citing congressional action
as contributing to sentencing inequities).
183. Eskridge, supra note 44, at 335.
184. Professor Eskridge defines a "congressional override" as the promulga-
tion of a statute that completely overrules the holding of a statutory interpreta-
tion decision, modifies the result such that the Court would decide the case
differently, or modifies the consequences of the decision such that the Court
would decide later cases differently. Id. at 332 & ni1.
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amendments, it most often has done so within five years of a
decision.' 8 5 This short response time suggests that Congress is
unlikely to act at this point, as the Court decided Chapman in
1991. On the other hand, congressional overrides have in-
creased recently.' 8 6 Criminal law statutes, furthermore, tradi-
tionally constitute the single largest group of statutes subject to
congressional overrides.' 87 Additionally, Congress, when it does
choose to act, is much more prone to override "plain meaning"
decisions such as Chapman.18 8
Congress can accept responsibility for resolving problems
created by the sentencing statute by following one of two very
different approaches. If Congress believes Amendment 488's ap-
proach is superior to the current Chapman approach, it can clar-
ify 21 U.S.C. § 841 to indicate precisely what constitutes a
"mixture or substance" for mandatory minimum sentencing pur-
poses. Congress need not wait for a long-overdue judicial rein-
terpretation of the sentencing statute. Congressional intent
should not remain hidden within that body, thereby subject to
continuing manipulation by the judiciary. Congress can follow
the Sentencing Commission's lead by incorporating into the sen-
tencing statute the same method of measuring the weight of
LSD as that contained in Amendment 488.
Alternatively, Congress can specifically repudiate the Com-
mission's approach in the Guidelines context and reaffirm its de-
sire for a dual weight calculation system. This approach,
however, would ignore the input of a commission that is "an in-
dependent agency in every relevant sense"' 8 9 and that is specifi-
cally charged with developing the bulk of sentencing policies.
3. The Supreme Court Should Revisit Chapman v. United
States
The Supreme Court, in the absence of decisive congressional
action, can remedy the Muschik controversy by revisiting Chap-
man. While both the sentencing statute and Amendment 488
are subject to manipulation, the Supreme Court realizes that its
185. Id. at 345 (noting that, in a study of congressional overrides of Supreme
Court decisions in the years 1967 to 1990, Congress overrode two-thirds of the
decisions within five years of the Court's decision).
186. Id. at 335-36 (noting that, in the years 1975 to 1990, Congress overrode
an average of 12 Court interpretive decisions each year).
187. Id. at 344 tbl. 4. Criminal law statutes constituted 15% of all congres-
sional overrides from 1967 to 1990. Id.
188. Id. at 348.
189. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989).
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Chapman interpretation is vulnerable to similar manipulation.
The Court recognizes that the circuits are deeply split over the
Chapman court's "mixture or substance" interpretation and the
precise holding in that case.' 90 The time appears ripe for a rein-
terpretation of the sentencing statute.
The Court can reaffirm its Chapman interpretation and in
the process once again signal Congress of the need for clarifica-
tion of the sentencing statute as to the appropriate weight mea-
sure of a "mixture or substance." This tactic would place the
onus on Congress to stipulate its policy choice. Congressional
inaction would reaffirm Congress's desire for the dual weight
measure system. 191
Alternatively, the Supreme Court can conform its "mixture
or substance" interpretation for mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing to the theory established in Muschik. Because the Guide-
lines now establish a uniform carrier weight measure that was
unavailable when Chapman was decided, the Court can now
choose to attribute that measure to the sentencing statute.192
This avenue presents the benefit of integrating the Sentenc-
ing Commission's approach into federal sentencing if Congress
refuses to act.'93 This approach also would rescue the sentenc-
190. See, e.g., Sewell v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 1367 (1993) (White, J., dis-
senting from a denial of certiorari).
191. This approach may be preferable in light of the observation that "fed-
eral judges are not the agents of Congress.... [It is the courts' role to carry out
congressional directives in light of their understanding of the Constitution."
Daniel J. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo.
L. J. 281, 284 (1989).
192. See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text (noting the Muschik
court's belief that Amendment 488 now provides a third option for calculating
LSD weight, unavailable at the time the Supreme Court decided Chapman);
supra note 88 (noting that the Supreme Court first consulted the Guidelines to
determine the meaning of "mixture or substance" before applying its own
definition).
Of course, this approach would require a modification of the Chapman in-
terpretation which, as many courts note, produced harsh sentences. The Court
ultimately would be forced to break from stare decisis. Such an approach would
raise the spectre of the four years of disproportionate and unfair sentencing
since the 1991 Chapman decision. This would, however, provide the Court with
the rationale missing in Chapman: that the Sentencing Commission now pro-
vides a definitive calculation method that promotes fairness and proportional-
ity. See Farber, supra note 191, at 307 (arguing that "the supremacy principle
[subordinating courts to legislatures] may allow courts to disobey clear statu-
tory language when, because of post-enactment events, the legislature's intent
would be undermined by strict adherence to the statutory formula").
193. Professor Sunstein, in fact, notes that agency input can be valuable
even if the ultimate interpretation remains with the courts. "[R]esolution of
statutory ambiguities may call for the agency's specialized capacities, even if
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ing statute's controversial interpretation from the stifling grip of
stare decisis. Finally, and perhaps most important, this ap-
proach would indicate that the federal judiciary values the Com-
mission's input as both an independent agency and a valuable
partner in the federal sentencing process.
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Muschik, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that United States Sentencing
Guideline Amendment 488 establishes a unitary LSD weight
measure for sentencing purposes under both the United States
Sentencing Guidelines and 21 U.S.C. § 841. The court held that
Amendment 488 controls the meaning of the term "mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount" of a controlled sub-
stance; a phrase contained within the Guidelines and 21 U.S.C.
§ 841. The court denied that its holding contradicted Amend-
ment 488's commentary, which states that the amended ap-
proach does not override the applicability of 21 U.S.C. § 841's
LSD weight measure that the Supreme Court earlier
established.
The Ninth Circuit's approach accords far greater interpre-
tive authority to the United States Sentencing Commission, a
judicial branch agency, than do traditional interpretive theories.
Although the Muschik court's intentions are laudable, its meth-
ods defy established interpretive rules that prevent agencies
from substantively altering a congressionally-promulgated stat-
ute. This Comment urges the United States Sentencing Com-
mission to clarify Amendment 488's limited reach to conform
with the Commission's limited congressional mandate. This
Comment also argues that Congress should reformulate 21
U.S.C. § 841 to conform to Amendment 488's approach in the
Guidelines. Alternatively, this Comment argues that the
Supreme Court should revisit and decisively resolve the "mix-
ture or substance" controversy that continues to split the cir-
cuits. By finally resolving the "mixture or substance"
controversy, Congress or the Court will insure that the judiciary
will not use the Federal Sentencing Commission's misunder-
stood and limited authority in the drug sentencing area to re-
solve a continuing circuit conflict.
the issue appears to be purely one of law.... [R]esolution of ambiguities often
calls for an assessment of issues of policy and principle. That assessment is
best made by agencies rather than courts." Sunstein, supra note 22, at 2095.
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